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Objective. To examine the effects of global budgeting on the distribution of dentists
and the use and cost of dental care in Taiwan.
Data Sources. (1) Monthly dental claim data from January 1996 to December 2001 for
the entire insured population in Taiwan. (2) The 1996–2001 population information
for the cities, counties and townships in Taiwan, abstracted from the Taiwan-Fukien
Demographic Fact Book.
Study Design. Longitudinal, using the autocorrelation model.
Principal Findings. Results indicated decline in dental care utilization, particularly
after the implementation of dental global budgeting. With few exceptions, dental global
budgeting did not improve the distribution of dental care and dentist supply.
Conclusions. The experience of the dental global budget program in Taiwan sug-
gested that dental global budgeting might contain dental care utilization and that several
conditions might have to be met in order for the reimbursement system to have effective
redistributive impact on dental care and dentist supply.
Key Words. Dental global budgeting, dental care, distribution of dentists, utiliza-
tion, costs
Cost-containment and equitable access to health services have been long-
standing concerns among health policymakers (Carr-Hill 1994; Davis 1991;
Smith and Sheldon 2000). As the demand for health care continues to grow
and the financial incentives that influence health professionals’ choice of
practice location remain differentiated geographically ( Johnston and Wilkin-
son 2001; Kobayashi and Takaki 1992), the significance of these issues is likely
to extend into the foreseeable future. However, because of the rapid rise of
health care cost in many countries since the 1970s, cost containment has
dominated the agenda of health policy, often at the expense of commitment to
ensuring equal access to health services.
Among the variety of cost containment mechanisms that have been
experimented, global budgeting has assumed increased popularity and ap-
peared to be effective in arresting the untamed growth of health care expen-
ditures in many Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD) and Asian countries (Carr-Hill 1994; Chu 1992; Detsky et al. 1990;
Detsky, Stacey, and Bombardier 1983; Henke, Murray, and Ade 1994; Lave,
Jacobs, and Markel 1992; Redmon and Yakoboski 1995; Wiley 1992). A study
by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1991 estimated that global budgets
in certain countries had lowered inflation-adjusted spending on health care
services by 9 to 17 percent. Examining the trend of pharmaceutical expen-
ditures in Germany, Ulrich and Wille (1996) found that compared with the
reference price system for expenditure control, the introduction of global
budgeting in 1993 had a more effective and lasting cost-containment impact.
More recently, Leonard et al. (2003) compared the case-based approach in
Austria with the global budgeting approach in Canada in terms of the impact
on hospital care and found that Austrian inpatients stayed longer in hospitals
than Canadian inpatients.
Despite this preliminary evidence, the literature on global budgeting is
mostly descriptive and prescriptive. Rigorous empirical assessment of the ef-
fects of global budgeting remains scarce (Wolfe and Moran 1993). Further-
more, existing studies are limited to global budgets for medical care (including
hospital and physician services) and pharmaceutical coverage. How effective
global budgeting is in relation to the control of dental care cost is largely
unknown. This study is intended to fill the gap by examining the impact of
global budgeting on dental care cost using data collected in the Taiwanese
National Health Insurance System, which recently underwent the process of
introducing global budgets into the dental care sector. Also in a departure
from previous studies that focused solely on the cost-containment outcomes of
global budgeting, this study assesses the impact of global budgeting on the
distribution of dental health manpower and dental care utilization.
The experience in Taiwan may further our understanding of the impact
of global budgeting for three reasons. First, dental care is seldom included as
part of the benefit package in countries that provide public or national health
insurance (NHI). Even less common is the administration of dental care
Funding for this study was from the National Science Council (NSC), Taiwan, R.O.C. (NSC89-
2416-H-002-029-SSS).
Address correspondence to Ya-Seng A. Hsueh, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of
Health Care Organization Administration, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University,
19 Hsu-Chu Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Shoou-Yih D. Lee, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor,
Department of Health Policy and Administration, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Yu-Tung A. Huang, M.S., is a Doctoral Student, Institute of Public Health, School of Medicine,
National Yang-Ming University, Peitou, Taipei, Taiwan.
2136 HSR: Health Services Research 39:6, Part II (December 2004)
expenditure through a global budgeting mechanism (with Germany being
another exception), thus limiting our understanding of the cost and utilization
of dental care in a government-controlled health insurance system. Second,
supply-side cost control mechanisms, such as global budgeting, may have
unintended consequences for health service availability. The Taiwanese sys-
tem adopts an explicit redistributive design that sets a different budget cap for
each health insurance region on a per capita basis. Understanding whether the
design results in more or less equitable distribution of health manpower and
health care utilization would be of interest to health policymakers. Third, the
enactment of Taiwanese NHI preceded the implementation of global budgets
by more than three years. The lag enables us to separate the confounding
effect of national health insurance from the redistributive effects of global
budgeting on dentist supply and dental care utilization.
TAIWANESE GLOBAL BUDGETING SYSTEM
The Act of National Health Insurance in Taiwan specifically required the
adoption of a global budgeting system in health care reimbursement. Imple-
mentation of the reimbursement system began in July 1998, more than three
years after the enactment of Taiwanese NHI in March 1995. Similar to those of
OECD countries such as Canada, Germany, and France, the global budgets in
Taiwan are specific to different sectors of the health care delivery system. The
implementation was incremental: first for dental care in July 1998, second for
Chinese traditional medicine in July 2000, third for office-based medical care
in July 2001, and lastly for hospital care in July 2002 (Cheng 2003).
The global budgeting system is designed to replace a national fee-for-
service payment system that was in place since the installation of NHI. The
budget process takes the form of negotiation between the funding source and
the health care sector to which the budget is applied. The negotiation is con-
ducted in a committee, with representatives from the Bureau of National
Health Insurance (the sole insurer), health provider associations, labor unions,
employer groups, as well as health insurance experts and academic research-
ers. Every year, a fee negotiation committee under the supervision of the
Department of Health negotiates and sets the total health care budget to be
spent in the following year for the specific sector. The budget is then divided
and allocated to six health insurance regions according to the relative size of
the region’s population. The insurance regions are groupings of adjacent ad-
ministrative areas, formed by the Bureau of National Health Insurance to
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divide the nation into six regions with similar population and geographical
sizes (Figure 1). Within each region, NHI-reimbursed dental care expendi-
tures are capped by the allocated budget and the cap is binding.
Implementation of Dental Global Budgeting
An important goal of Taiwanese dental global budgeting was to achieve equity
in dental care resources through population-based allocation of annual global
budgets. In view of the significant regional differences in dental expenditures
and for fear of the resistance of providers and patients to a swift change in the
Figure 1: Geographic Coverage of Six Health Insurance Regions in Taiwan’s
National Health Insurance System
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reimbursement method, several phased-in steps were taken to allocate dental
global budgets according to the capitation design. Starting in the fiscal year
that began in July 1998, a yearly expenditure cap for dental care was deter-
mined annually by a fee negotiation committee. However, in the initial phase
between July 1998 and June 1999, only 10 percent of the budget allocation
across health insurance regions used the population-based approach. The
other 90 percent of the budget was still allocated based on experienced ex-
penditure. In the second phase from July 1999 to December 2000, the pop-
ulation-based allocation of the global budget was raised to 20 percent. In the
remaining phases, the percentage of population-based allocation continued to
increase to 40 percent in fiscal year 2001, 50 percent in fiscal year 2002, 70
percent in fiscal year 2003, 90 percent in fiscal year 2004, and eventually to
100 percent in fiscal year 2005 and afterwards.
The Bureau of National Health Insurance authorizes each health insur-
ance region to form a peer review organization under the supervision of the
National Dentist Association to process and audit claims and undertake other
peer review functions. Reimbursement to dentists is based on an existing fee-
for-service schedule, which lists each reimbursable service and its points of
worth. Except for the copayment and registration fee per visit, there is no out-
of-pocket cost for the insured that receive care.1 A dentist’s monthly revenue,
therefore, is the product of total service points in a month and the dollar value
for each point in a particular region. The dollar value for each service point is
recalculated every three months based on the region’s expenditure and total
service points during that period. Restricted by the predetermined expend-
iture cap, a region that has a higher service volume would have a lower dollar
value per service point, and vice versa. The insured can receive dental care
across regions and the costs are paid off between regions at the end of the year
based on the dollar value of each service point in the region where the services
were provided. Thus, the reimbursement rates for dental services are floating
and are different across health insurance regions depending on the amount of
the allocated budget, amount of services demanded, and the practice pattern
of dentists in a region.
Because over 90 percent of dentists in Taiwan are private practitioners, it
is uncertain how the peer review influences the behavior of dentists. Results of
claim reviews seem to depend on the aggressiveness of the peer review group,
despite that every group follows the same principles and procedures set up by
the National Dentist Association. This is evidenced in the variation of dollar
value per service point across health insurance regions. Based on quarterly
figures from the third quarter of 1998 (the first quarter of dental global budget)
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to the fourth quarter of 2001, the highest mean dollar value per service point is
1.09 for the Eastern region with standard deviation of 0.09 and the lowest
mean value is 0.95 for the Central region with standard deviation of 0.04.
HYPOTHESES
As with the logic underlying the global budgeting systems in other countries,
the annual expenditure cap provides health care providers an incentive to use
inputs efficiently in service delivery and to eliminate unnecessary health care
(Cowan 1997). Thus, we expect dental utilization to decline after the imple-
mentation of dental global budgeting in Taiwan.
A distinct design feature of Taiwanese dental global budgeting is that
distribution of expenditures is determined based on a capitation system, that
is, according to the population size of a defined geographic area. Thus, dental
global budgeting may equalize the allocation of dental care resources and
induce dentists to practice in traditionally underserved areas. According to the
efficient markets theory (La Porta et al. 1997), market efficiency could be
achieved when the price in the market is transparent and reflects all relevant
information. As information about the global budget, the dollar value of each
service point (adjusted every three months), and the average levels of dentist
income in different geographic areas would become readily accessible to
dentists under the global budgeting system, market efficiency may be mate-
rialized to reduce the geographic differences in dentist supply and dental care
accessibility. To illustrate, two geographic areas, A and B, have an equal size of
population but A has a higher dentists to population ratio than B. Under the
Taiwanese dental global budget system, dentists in A will have less revenue,
on average, than dentists in B. All things being equal, the assumption of
income maximization among dentists would have us predict a gradual mi-
gration of dentists from A to B, thus reducing the discrepancy in access to
dental services between the two areas.
METHODS
Research Design and Data
The study took advantage of a natural experiment in the Taiwanese NHI. The
policy intervention was the introduction of dental global budgeting in July 1998.
The analysis used monthly dental claim data from January 1996 to December
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2001, a total of 72 monthly observations, for the entire insured population in
Taiwan. The data contained utilization and cost information for outpatient
dental visits, patient identifiers, and the identification numbers of dentists that
provided the services. The National Health Research Institute, authorized by
the Bureau of National Health Insurance, generated and provided the dataset.
Annual information about the population sizes of cities, counties and townships
in Taiwan was abstracted from the Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, pub-
lished by the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China (ROC).
To define geographic units that reflect the patterns of health service
provision and utilization, the Department of Health, ROC, developed a
Medical Service Area (MSA) System in the Medical Regionalization Network
Plan of Taiwan. The system grouped adjacent administrative boundaries
(mainly townships) into a medical district based on population size, health care
manpower and facilities, road and transportation systems, and concentration
of residents using the same sets of health care facilities and resources. As a
result, 17 medical service areas were formed, which were further divided into
64 submedical districts.2 Each of the 64 submedical districts belongs to a
health insurance region. The number of submedical districts in the health
insurance region ranges from 7 to 15.
These 64 submedical districts constituted the units of analysis in this
study. The determination of these analytical units was based on two consid-
erations. First, as Wilson and Tedeschi (1984) suggested, the area population
should be homogeneous in that residents in the area sought care at the same
cluster of health care facilities. Second, of the three levels of geographic di-
vision in the MSA system (i.e., health insurance regions, medical districts, and
submedical districts), the submedical districts displayed the greatest amount of
variation in the dependent variables of the analysis and therefore were most
likely to reflect changes in dental care resources and utilization.
Assessment of Dentist and Utilization Distribution
Following Peacock, Devlin, and McGee (1999), the change in equity was first
assessed by comparing and tracking the difference in resource distribution
between the upper and lower quartile of the submedical districts to see if the
discrepancy reduced annually (indicative of improved equity) over the study
period. Furthermore, the Lorenz curve’s Gini coefficient was calculated using
monthly data to evaluate the impact of global budgeting on the distribution of
dentists and dental care use. The Gini coefficient provides an overall estimate
of inequity in dentists and utilization distribution (Chen 2002; Morrow 1997;
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Lynch et al. 1998). It ranges between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating
greater inequity.
Gini coefficients were computed for four dental care indicators across
submedical districts——number of dentists, number of dental visits, number of
dental patients, and dental care expenditures——as dependent variables in the
multivariate analysis. The number of dentists represented the supply of the
key dental care manpower in each geographic area. The number of dental
visits and the number of dental patients reflected the level of demand for
dental services. Because patients had different needs and the nature of dental
visits varied, dental care expenditures were also included to assess the amount
of dental care resources utilized in each area.
Gini coefficients were calculated monthly throughout the study period.
Although the allocation of dental global budgets was not yet 100 percent based
on the capitation system when the study was concluded, the study spanned
across the pre-global budget period and the first three phases of the dental
global budgeting program. Thus, the study data could be used to determine if
change in the distribution of dentists and dental care utilization was due to the
installation of global budgeting and the subsequent increases in capitated
budget allocation.
Statistical Analysis
The interrupted autocorrelation analysis was used to determine whether den-
tal global budgeting resulted in any significant change in the distribution of
dentists and dental care utilization, holding constant the initial time trend. The
analysis was employed to examine the impact of hospital global budgeting in
France (Redmon and Yakoboski 1995). A recent study by Van De Voorde,
Van Doorslaer, and Schokkaert (2001) showed that the time-series model was
comparable to the ‘‘difference model’’ based on the difference between an
intervention group and a comparison group (i.e., a group not experiencing the
study policy change). Specifically, the research demonstrated that the time-
series model produced reliable findings in the absence of a comparison group
in the study design.
A simplified representation of the model used in this study is as follows:
Ginit ¼ C þ TimeTrend þ TimeLag þ GB%Capitation
þ TimeTrend GB%Capitation þ e
where Ginit is the Gini coefficient for month t, C a constant, TimeTrend a time
function (coded 1 for the first month of the study period, 2 the second month,
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etc.), TimeLag a serial correlation function, and GB%Capitation representing
the percentage of capitated budget allocation (with 0 indicating the pre-global
budget period). An interaction term of TimeTrend and GB%Capitation was also
included to capture the joint effect of the two variables. The model did not
control for the aggregate socioeconomic status of each submedical district,
because the variation across districts remained stable during the study period.
TimeTrend was included to take into account the natural growth, as re-
sulting from the national health insurance and other social and economic
factors, and to separate it from the effect of dental global budgeting. With time-
series data, the model’s error terms are correlated between time periods,
known as autocorrelation or serial correlation. This violates an important
assumption of ordinary least squares that errors are identical and independ-
ently distributed (iid ), resulting in incorrect t-statistics for hypothesis testing
because of inefficient estimation of the coefficients. We evaluated the order of
autocorrelation and found a one-month lag in the data. Thus, an AR(1) proc-
ess——that is, using previous month’s observation as a covariate to capture the
time lag effect——was employed in the model. A sudden rise in dental visits,
dental expenditure, and dental patients was observed in December of each
year. A dummy variable, December, was therefore included to capture this
temporal pattern. The model was estimated using the SHAZAM econometric
software version 9, Professional Edition (Northwest Econometrics Ltd., 2001).
RESULTS
The annual changes in dental care statistics between 1996 and 2001 are pre-
sented in Table 1. Over the period, the insured population grew steadily, ap-
proaching complete health insurance coverage for the nation’s population in
2001. Access to dental care——indicated by the number of dental patients——also
improved significantly; by 2001, 39.48 percent of the nation’s population had
received dental care. Increased financial accessibility through insurance cov-
erage also affected the total number of dental visits and the total dental ex-
penditure, both rising annually throughout the study period. Despite this
increase, it is interesting to note that the number of dental visits per patient, the
expenditure per dental visit, and the expenditure per dental patient remained
rather stable over the same period. In fact, the number of dental visits per patient
declined after 1998. The average expenditure per patient also dropped between
1998 and 1999 and increased only mildly afterward. Both of these results may
be attributable to the implementation of dental global budgeting in 1998.
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Also presented in Table 1 was the trend of dentist supply, that is, the total
number of dentists as well as the number relative to population size——which
declined in 1997 and rose gradually for the remaining period.
We expected increased equity as a result of dental global budgeting. This
prediction was first assessed by comparing the relative levels of dental care
utilization and dentist supply in the upper- and lower-quartile submedical
districts. As indicated in Table 2, the expectation was supported. All the four
variables assessed displayed changes that were consistent with our expecta-
tion; that is, the discrepancy between submedical districts in the upper quartile
and those in the lower quartile (based on the upper quartile to lower quartile
ratio) decreased over the period from 1996–2001.
Interrupted time-series analysis using monthly data of the 64 submedical
districts was performed to further examine the prediction of improved equity.
Results are presented in Table 3. Of note is that the adjusted R squares of the
models were above 0.9, suggesting a good fit of the models. The Durbin-
Watson tests for the models were all larger than 1.837, which is the upper limit
of the Durbin-Watson d statistic with n5 70 (n5 72 in our case), k5 7, and
significance level at p o 0.05, suggesting the absence of the first-order serial
correlation problem in the models.
As shown in Table 3, the beta coefficients of the variable TimeTrend were
negative and statistically significant across the models, indicating a general
Table 1: Trend of the Insured Population, Dental Care Utilization, and
Dentist Supply in Taiwan, 1996–2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No. insured
population
20,041,448 20,492,317 20,757,185 21,089,859 21,400,826 21,653,555
No. dental patients 6,623,272 7,172,871 7,553,040 7,856,629 8,113,287 8,547,870
Total dental visits 19,038,770 21,469,235 22,876,678 23,447,747 23,748,287 24,757,644
Total expenditure
(in NT$1,000)
17,150,742 19,629,071 21,770,286 23,252,292 25,087,115 26,668,808
No. dentists 9,267 9,110 9,200 9,419 9,679 9,850
Percent dental
patients/insured
33.05% 35.00% 36.39% 37.25% 37.91% 39.48%
Dental visits/patients 2.87 2.99 3.03 2.98 2.93 2.90
Expenditure
(in NT$)/visits
900.8 914.3 952.6 991.7 1056.4 1077.2
Expenditure
(in NT$)/patients
2589.5 2736.6 3028.8 2959.6 3092.1 3119.9
No. dentists per
100,000 insured
46.24 44.46 44.32 44.66 45.23 45.49
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trend of improvement in the equity of dental care utilization and dentist supply
in Taiwan. The beta coefficients for GB%Capitation were also negative and,
supporting our expectation, two of them——the ones for the Gini coefficients of
dental visits and dentists——were statistically significant at po0.10. This sug-
gests that, ceteris paribus, there was an improvement toward more equitable
access to dental care and more even distribution of dentists across submedical
districts subsequent to the introduction of dental global budgeting. Such im-
provement, however, did not last and appeared to reduce over time as in-
dicated by the significant and positive coefficients associated with the
interaction term between TimeTrend and GB%Capitation. Similarly, the inter-
action term was significant and positive in the model for dental patients, sug-
gesting that the distribution of dental patients became less even over time in
the postglobal budget period, despite a general time trend of increased equity.
The only significant and negative interaction term between TimeTrend and
GB%Capitation was associated with dental expenditures. One interpretation is
that dental expenditures became gradually more equitable after the imple-
mentation of dental global budgeting.
With one exception, the variable December was statistically significant
and positive in the models shown in Table 3, suggesting that dental care
utilization became less even in December of each observed year. The
Table 2: Comparisons between the Upper and Lower Quartiles of All 64
Submedical Districts in Taiwan Based on Dental Care Utilization and Dentist
Supply, 1996–2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percent dental patients/insured
Upper quartile 42.47 45.03 46.10 47.13 47.72 50.00
Lower quartile 18.68 21.38 22.93 24.07 24.86 26.45
Upper quartile/lower quartile 2.27 2.11 2.01 1.96 1.92 1.89
Dental visits/patients
Upper quartile 3.09 3.26 3.30 3.23 3.14 3.09
Lower quartile 2.71 2.80 2.83 2.81 2.80 2.79
Upper quartile/lower quartile 1.14 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.12 1.11
Expenditure (NT$)/patients
Upper quartile 2,760.71 2,911.65 3,049.83 3,136.43 3,254.70 3,286.06
Lower quartile 2,220.47 2,386.80 2,523.46 2,668.72 2,857.85 2,905.81
Upper quartile/lower quartile 1.24 1.22 1.21 1.18 1.14 1.13
No. dentists per 100,000 insured
Upper quartile 76.55 72.85 72.80 71.31 71.75 71.53
Lower quartile 18.42 18.60 19.38 21.22 22.62 22.51
Upper quartile/lower quartile 4.16 3.92 3.76 3.36 3.17 3.18
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coefficients for variable AR(1) indicated significant and positive autocorrela-
tions in the longitudinal panel observations.
As a final test, we repeated the interrupted time-series analysis for each
health insurance region (i.e., stratified time-series analysis) to assess whether
the same patterns of results could be obtained across the six regions. The
dependent variables were the Gini coefficients among submedical districts
within each health insurance region. Findings are presented in Table 4, fo-
cusing on the impact of dental global budgeting on the equity of dental care
and dentist distribution. The pattern of results varied across health insurance
regions, with some regions (the Southern and Eastern regions) displaying
greater improvement in the equity of dental care than others.
DISCUSSION
This study was based on a natural experiment in Taiwan’s national health
insurance system to investigate the impact of global budgeting on dental care
utilization and the equity of dental care and dentist distribution——an issue that
was heretofore unexamined in the literature. We expected that, based on the
design features of the Taiwanese global budgeting program, the utilization of
dental care would decline and the distribution of dental care and dentists
would become more equitable as a result of dental global budgeting. Results
provided partial support for our expectations.
First of all, it is worth noting the success of the Taiwanese National
Health Insurance System in approaching full coverage and thus ensuring
equitable financial access to health care across different socioeconomic sectors
of the population. An example of the progress can be found in the increased
access to dental care, indicated by the percentage of dental patients in the
insured population, between 1996 and 2001.
Access to dental care, however, is no assurance that the care obtained
was appropriate and that services were delivered efficiently. Free of cost con-
cerns, the insured would be more likely to seek care, whether it is needed or
not (Manning et al. 1987). Similarly, without cost constraints, health care
providers might inflate service demands and incur unnecessary services, in
part because of their asymmetric dominance of medical information (Fuchs
1986). As such, a significant increase in utilization might be expected in a
national health insurance system. The results of our analysis showed other-
wise. Despite the growth of dental care coverage, the dental expenditure per
dental visit remained stable and was in line with the inflation rate during the
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study period. Changes in the number of dental visits and the expenditure per
patient were also small and displayed some decline after 1998, suggesting a
positive impact of dental global budgeting in utilization control.
Improved access to dental care does not necessarily reduce the unequal
distribution of dental care and dentist supply across geographic areas. As the
global budget for dental care were allocated on a per capita basis to local areas,
we expected the reimbursement system might improve the equity of dental
care and dentist distributions over time. This expectation was not strongly
supported in the analysis. Overall, results indicated improved equity over the
study period based on the comparison of submedical districts in the upper and
lower quartiles of dental care and dentist supply. The improvement in the
majority of cases could not be attributed to the implementation of dental
global budgeting, but was mainly accounted for by a general time trend that
was unrelated to the new reimbursement system.
Several reasons may explain the finding. First, the allocation of dental
global budgets was not 100 percent based on the relative population size of health
insurance regions. Therefore, the financial incentive might not be strong enough
to rectify the unequal distribution of dental care and dentist supply. Second, an
unofficial survey found that 20 percent to 70 percent dental expenditures came
from patients’ out-of-pocket payments for nonreimbursable services, suggesting
that government reimbursement in the national health insurance system did not
constitute the sole source of dentists’ revenue. Thus, global budgeting had little
impact on the distribution of dental care and dentist supply, because patients and
dentists were able to incur services beyond the mandated coverage of national
health insurance depending on patients’ ability to pay out-of-pocket and because
of the lack of incentive for dentists to relocate their practice so long as they could
maintain the same ‘‘target income’’ by providing additional services.
Third, over 90 percent of dentists in Taiwan were independent, free-
standing practitioners. In such ‘‘diffused’’ markets, individual dentists’ deliv-
ery of services might have a trivial impact on the payment rates under the
global budgeting system. A rational decision of dentists, therefore, was to
ignore this trivial impact when making resource allocation decisions. Alter-
natively, dentists might rush to provide services early in the budget year and
reduce the service amount later in the year on the assumption that reim-
bursement rates would be adjusted downward over the budget year to con-
form to the global cap. Or, they might choose to provide fewer services if
reimbursement rates decreased significantly. In other words, the changes in
labor supply induced by global budgets are not necessarily efficiency en-
hancing as the efficient markets theory dictates.3
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Fourth, financial incentives alone might be insufficient to affect im-
provement in dental care and dentist distributions. An organizational com-
ponent was built in the global budgeting system that relied on peer review
groups at the region level to monitor and audit the utilization of dental serv-
ices. Along with the population-based allocation of global budgets, the design
of peer review, in theory, should help reduce the geographic variation in
dental care and dentist supply within and across health insurance regions. In
practice, the influence of peer review groups might vary depending on the
organizational autonomy of the review group, the level of consensus among
local providers, and the collective interests of dentists in the region. A review
group might be weak if it became a captive of local interest groups and there-
fore lacked the autonomy to follow the auditing guidelines in policing the
practice of dentists. A strong review group, on the other hand, could work to
serve the common good of patients, thus equalizing the dental resources in the
region, or to protect the interest of existing members by barring the entry of
dentists into the local markets. All this might produce variant effects, ham-
pering or facilitating the redistributive impact of dental global budgeting, as
indicated in the results of the stratified time-series analysis by health insurance
region. Understanding of the specific role of the peer review groups in uti-
lization control and dental resource distribution, however, is limited and will
await future research.
In addition, it is interesting to note that changes in the distribution of
dental care utilization were not necessarily consistent with changes in dentist
distribution. While health manpower policies usually operate under the as-
sumption that even distribution of health care providers is required to ensure
equitable accessibility to health care (Capilouto and Ohsfeldt 1996), our anal-
ysis suggested that financial incentives might have redistributive effects on
health care access and utilization in the absence of an effective intervention on
health manpower distribution.
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
The use of time-series data enhanced our ability to assess the independent
impact of dental global budgeting on the level and distribution of dental care
and dentist supply. The design, however, could not adequately rule out
the potential effects of other concurrent events on the examined outcomes.
One way to test this possibility is to compare our analysis with that of a
different health care (e.g., inpatient care, Chinese medicine) that has a different
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timetable for global budgeting. Data restrictions, unfortunately, prevented us
from making the comparison.
Furthermore, in areas with a given global budget, rent-seeking may lead
to inequitable outcomes. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status (SES),
for example, may be better able to capture the globally budgeted funds, so if
there are service shortages induced by global budgets, those with lower SES
may lose out. Thus global budgets could worsen equity. This may explain the
many positive effects of global budgeting on Gini coefficients in the region-
specific time-series analysis. Lack of sociodemographic information at the sub-
medical district level restricted our ability to explore such variations by SES.
Despite these limitations, the experience of Taiwan’s dental global
budgeting suggests that the reimbursement system may contain dental care
utilization and that several conditions——including complete allocation of glo-
bal budgets on a per capita basis, control of out-of-pocket payment from
patients, appropriate organization and implementation of peer review
groups——may have to be met if the reimbursement system were to have ef-
fective redistributive impact on dental care and dentist supply. These could be
of important lessons to policymakers in countries that are confronted with
both cost containment and equitable access issues.
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NOTES
1. Low-income individuals and certain categories of disadvantaged populations are
exempted from all the copayments.
2. The official design of the Medical Service Area (MSA) System constitutes 63 sub-
medical districts. For the purpose of the analysis, we included the remote islands of
Taiwan as the 64th submedical district.
3. We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this explanation.
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